Abstract. Proof search has been used to specify a wide range of computation systems. In order to build a framework for reasoning about such specifications, we make use of a sequent calculus involving induction and co-induction. These proof principles are based on a proof theoretic (rather than set-theoretic) notion of definition [13, 20, 25, 51] . Definitions are akin to (stratified) logic programs, where the left and right rules for defined atoms allow one to view theories as "closed" or defining fixed points. The use of definitions makes it possible to reason intensionally about syntax, in particular enforcing free equality via unification. We add in a consistent way rules for pre and post fixed points, thus allowing the user to reason inductively and co-inductively about properties of computational system making full use of higher-order abstract syntax. Consistency is guaranteed via cut-elimination, where we give the first, to our knowledge, cut-elimination procedure in the presence of general inductive and co-inductive definitions.
Introduction
A common approach to specifying computation systems is via deductive systems. Those are used to specify and reason about various logics, as well as aspects of programming languages such as operational semantics, type theories, abstract machines etc. Such specifications can be represented as logical theories in a suitably expressive formal logic where proof-search can then be used to model the computation. A logic used as a specification language is known as a logical frameworks [39] , which comes equipped with a representation methodology. The encoding of the syntax of deductive systems inside formal logic can benefit from the use of higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) [40] , a high-level and declarative treatment of object-level bound variables and substitution. At the same time, we want to use such a logic in order to reason over the meta-theoretical properties of object languages, for example type preservation in operational semantics [26] , soundness and completeness of compilation [32] or congruence of bisimulation in transition systems [27] . Typically this involves reasoning by (structural) induction and, when dealing with infinite behavior, co-induction [23] .
The need to support both inductive and co-inductive reasoning and some form of HOAS requires some careful design decisions, since the two are prima facie notoriously incompatible. While any meta-language based on a λ-calculus can be used to specify and animate HOAS encodings, meta-reasoning has traditionally involved (co)inductive specifications both at the level of the syntax and of the judgements -which are of course unified at the type-theoretic level. The first provides crucial freeness properties for datatypes constructors, while the second offers principle of case analysis and (co)induction. This is well-known to be problematic, since HOAS specifications lead to non-monotone (co)inductive operators, which by cardinality and consistency reasons are not permitted in inductive logical frameworks. Moreover, even when HOAS is weakened so as to be made compatible with standard proof assistants [12] such as HOL or Coq, the latter suffer the fate of allowing the existence of too many functions and yielding the so called exotic terms. Those are canonical terms in the signature of an HOAS encoding that do not correspond to any term in the deductive system under study. This causes a loss of adequacy in HOAS specifications, which is one of the pillar of formal verification, and it undermines the trust in formal derivations. On the other hand, logics such as LF [21] that are weak by design [10] in order to support this style of syntax are not directly endowed with (co)induction principles.
The contribution of this paper lies in the design of a new logic, called Linc − (for a logic with λ-terms, induction and co-induction), 3 which carefully adds principles of induction and co-induction to a higher-order intuitionistic logic based on a proof theoretic notion of definition, following on work (among others) Lars Hallnäs [20] , Eriksson [13] , Schroeder-Heister [51] and McDowell and Miller [25] . Definitions are akin to logic programs, but allow us to view theories as "closed" or defining fixed points. This alone allows us to perform case analysis independently from induction principles. Our approach to formalizing induction and co-induction is via the least and greatest solutions of the fixed point equations specified by the definitions. Such least and greatest solutions are guaranteed to exist by imposing a stratification condition on definitions (which basically ensures monotonicity). The proof rules for induction and co-induction makes use of the notion of pre-fixed points and post-fixed points respectively. In the inductive case, this corresponds to the induction invariant, while in the co-inductive one to the so-called simulation.
The simply typed language underlying Linc − and the notion of definition make it possible to reason intensionally about syntax, in particular enforcing free equality via unification, which can be used on first-order terms or higherorder λ-terms. In fact, we can support HOAS encodings of constants without requiring them to be the constructors of a (recursive) datatype, which could not exist for cardinality reasons. In particular we can prove the freeness properties of those constructors, namely injectivity, distinctness and case exhaustion. Judgements are encoded as definitions accordingly to their informal semantics, either inductive or co-inductive. Definitions that are true in every fixed point will not be given here special consideration.
Linc − can be proved to be a conservative extension of FOλ ∆IN [25] and a generalization with a higher-order language of Martin-Löf [24] first-order theory of iterated inductive definitions. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first sequent calculus with a syntactical cut-elimination theorem for co-inductive definitions. In recent years, several logical systems have been designed that build on the core features of Linc − . In particular, one interesting, and orthogonal, extension is the addition of the ∇-quantifier [14, 31, 56, 57] , which allows one to reason about the intentional aspects of names and bindings in object syntax specifications (see, e.g., [15, 58, 59] ). The cut elimination proof presented in this paper can be used as a springboard towards cut elimination procedures for more expressive (conservative) extensions of Linc − such as the ones with ∇. Here lies the added value of the present paper, which extends and revises a conference paper published in the proceedings of TYPES 2003 [33] . In the conference version, the co-inductive rule had a technical side condition that is restrictive and unnatural. The restriction was essentially imposed by the particular cut elimination proof technique outlined in that paper. This restriction has been removed in the present version, and as such the cut elimination proof itself has consequently been significantly revised.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the sequent calculus for the logic Linc − . Section 3 shows some examples of using induction and co-induction to prove properties of list-related predicates and the lazy λ-calculus. Section 4 studies several properties of derivations in Linc − that will be used extensively in the cut-elimination proof (Section 5). Section 6 surveys the related work and Section 7 concludes this paper.
The Logic Linc

−
The logic Linc − shares the core fragment of FOλ ∆IN , which is an intuitionistic version of Church's Simple Theory of Types. Formulae in the logic are built from predicate symbols and the usual logical connectives ⊥, ⊤, ∧, ∨, ⊃, ∀ τ and ∃ τ . Following Church, formulae will be given type o. The quantification type τ (omitted in the rest of the paper) can have base or higher types, but those are restricted not to contain o. Thus the logic has a first-order proof theory but allows the encoding of higher-order abstract syntax.
We assume the usual notion of capture-avoiding substitutions. Substitutions are ranged over by lower-case Greek letters, e.g., θ, ρ and σ. Application of substitution is written in postfix notation, e.g. tθ denotes the term resulting from an application of substitution θ to t. Composition of substitutions, denoted by •, is defined as t(θ • ρ) = (tθ)ρ.
The whole logic is presented in the sequent calculus in Figure 1 . A sequent is denoted by Γ −→ C where C is a formula and Γ is a multiset of formulae. Notice that in the presentation of the rule schemes, we make use of HOAS, e.g., in the application B x it is implicit that B has no free occurrence of x. In particular we work modulo α-conversion without further notice. In the ∀R and ∃L rules, y is an eigenvariable that is not free in the lower sequent of the rule. Whenever we write a sequent, it is assumed implicitly that the formulae are well-typed and in βη-long normal forms: the type context, i.e., the types of the constants and the eigenvariables used in the sequent, is left implicit as well. The mc rule is a generalization of the cut rule that simplifies the presentation of the cut-elimination proof.
We extend the core fragment with a proof theoretic notion of equality and fixed points. Each of these extensions are discussed below.
Equality
The right introduction rule for equality is the standard one, that is, it recognizes that two terms are syntactically equal. The left introduction rule is more interesting. The substitution ρ in eqL is a unifier of s and t. Note that we specify the premise of eqL as a set, with the intention that every sequent in the set is a premise of the rule. This set is of course infinite, since for every unifier of (s,t), we can extend it to another unifier (e.g., by adding substitution pairs for variables not in the terms). However, in many cases, it is sufficient to consider a particular set of unifiers, which is often called a complete set of unifiers (CSU) [4] , from which any unifier can be obtained by composing a member of the CSU set with a substitution. In the case where the terms are first-order terms, or higher-order terms with the pattern restriction [30] , the set CSU is a singleton, i.e., there exists a most general unifier (MGU) for the terms.
Equality rules:
{Γρ −→ Cρ | sρ = βη tρ} s = t, Γ −→ C eqL Γ −→ t = t
Induction rules:
B S y −→ S y Γ, S t −→ C Γ, p t −→ C IL , p x µ = B p x Γ −→ B p t Γ −→ p t IR , p x µ = B p
Co-induction rules:
In examples and applications, we shall use a more restricted version of eqL using CSU:
Replacing eqL with eqL CSU does not change the class of provable formulae, as shown in [56] . Note that in applying eqL and eqL CSU , eigenvariables can be instantiated as a result. Note also that if the premise set of eqL and eqL CSU are empty, then the sequent in the conclusion is considered proved. Our treatment of equality implicitly assumes the notion of free equality as commonly found in logic programming. More specifically, the axioms of free equality [9] , that is, injectivity of function symbols, inequality between distinct function symbols, and the "occur-check" are enforced via unification in the eqL -rule. For instance, given a base type nt (for natural numbers) and the constants z : nt (zero) and s : nt → nt (successor), we can derive ∀x. z = (s x) ⊃ ⊥ as follows:
Since z and s x are not unifiable, the eqL rule above has empty premise, thus concluding the derivation. We can also prove the injectivity of the successor function, i.e. ∀x∀y.
This proof theoretic notion of equality has been considered in several previous work e.g. by by Schroeder-Heister [51] , and McDowell and Miller [25] .
Induction and co-induction
One way of adding induction and co-induction is to introduce fixed point expressions and their associated introduction rules, i.e. using the µ and ν operators of the (first-order) µ-calculus. This is essentially what we shall follow here, but with a different notation. Instead of using a "nameless" notation using µ and ν to express fixed points, we associate a fixed point equation with an atomic formula. That is, we associate certain designated predicates with a definition. This notation is clearer and more convenient as far as our examples and applications are concerned. For the proof system using nameless notation for inductive and co-inductive predicates, the interested reader is referred to a recent work by Baelde and Miller [5] . It is technically convenient to bundle up all the definitional clause for a given predicate in a single clause, so that a predicate may occur only at most once in the heads of the clauses of a definition, following the same principles of the iff-completion in logic programming [50] . Further, in order to simplify the presentation of some rules that involve predicate substitutions, we sometimes denote a definition using an abstraction over predicates, that is
where B is an abstraction with no free occurrence of predicate symbol p and variables x. Substitution of p in the body of the clause with a formula S can then be written simply as B S x. When writing definition clauses, we often omit the outermost universal quantifiers, with the assumption that free variables in a clause are universally quantified (such variables will often be denoted with capital letters). We shall write ∀ x. p x △ = B p x to denote a definition clause generally, i.e., when we are not interested in the details of whether it is an inductive or a co-inductive definition.
The introduction rules for (co-)inductively defined atoms are given at the bottom of Figure 1 . The abstraction S is an invariant of the (co-)induction rule, which is of the same type as p. The variables y are new eigenvariables. For the induction rule IL , S denotes a pre-fixed point of the underlying fixed point operator. Similarly, for the co-induction rule CIL , S can be seen as denoting a post-fixed point of the same operator. Here, we use a characterization of induction and co-induction proof rules as, respectively, the least and the greatest solutions to a fixed point equation. To guarantee soundness of these rules, we shall restrict the (co)inductive definitions to ones which are monotone. In this case, the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorems tell us that the existence of a pre-fixed point (respectively, post-fixed point) implies the existence of a least (resp., greatest) fixed point. Monotonicity is enforced by a syntactic condition on definitions, as it is used for the logic FOλ ∆IN [25] : we rule out definitions with circular calling through implications (negations) that can lead to inconsistency [49] . The notion of level of a formula allows us to define a proper stratification on definitions.
Definition 2.
To each predicate p we associate a natural number lvl(p), the level of p. Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is defined as follows: Note that when p is vacuous in B and p dominates B, we obviously have lvl(B) < lvl(p).
From now on, we shall be concerned only with stratified definitions. An occurrence of a formula A in a formula C is strictly positive if that particular occurrence of A is not to the left of any implication in C. Stratification then implies that all occurrences of the head in the body are strictly positive, and that there is no mutual recursion between different definition clauses. This restriction to non-mutual recursion is just for the sake of simplicity in the presentation of the underlying idea of the cut elimination proof. This proof (Section 5) can be extended to handle mutually recursive definitions with some straightforward, albeit tedious, modifications. In the first-order case, the restriction to non-mutual recursion is immaterial, since one can easily encode mutually recursive predicates as a single predicate with an extra argument. For example, consider the following mutual recursive definitions for even and odd numbers.
We can collapse these two definition clauses into a single one, with a parameter that takes a constant e (for 'even') or o (for 'odd'):
We then define even and odd as follows:
This definition can be stratified by assigning levels to the predicate symbols such that lvl(evod) < lvl(even) < lvl(odd).
Examples
We now give some examples, starting with some that make essential use of HOAS.
Lazy λ-Calculus
We consider an untyped version of the pure λ-calculus with lazy evaluation, following the usual HOAS style, i.e., object-level λ-operator and application are encoded as constants lam : (tm → tm) → tm and @ : tm → tm → tm, where tm is the syntactic category of object-level λ-terms. The evaluation relation is encoded as the following inductive definition
Notice that object-level substitution is realized via β-reduction in the meta-logic. The notion of applicative simulation of λ-expressions [1] can be encoded as the (stratified) co-inductive definition
Given this encoding, we can prove the reflexivity property of simulation, i.e., ∀s. sim s s. This is proved co-inductively by using the simulation λxλy. x = y. After applying ∀R and CIR , it remains to prove the sequents −→ s = s, and
The first sequent is provable by an application of eqR rule. The second sequent is proved as follows.
The transitivity property is expressed as ∀r∀s∀t.sim r s ∧ sim s t ⊃ sim r t. Its proof involves co-induction on sim r t with the simulation λuλv.∃w.sim u w ∧ sim w v, followed by case analysis (i.e., defL and eqL rules) on sim r s and sim s t. The rest of the proof is purely logical.
We can also show the existence of divergent terms. Divergence is encoded as follows.
Let Ω be the term
. We show that divrg Ω holds. The proof is straightforward by coinduction using the simulation S := λs. s = Ω. Applying the CIR produces the sequents −→ Ω = Ω and T = Ω −→ S 1 ∨ S 2 where
, and
Clearly, only the second disjunct is provable, i.e., by instantiating T 1 and T 2 with the same term lam x.(x @ x), and E with the function λx.(x @ x).
Lists
Lists over some fixed type α are encoded as the type lst, with the usual constructor nil : lst for empty list and :: of type α → lst → lst. We consider here the append predicate for both the finite and infinite case.
Finite lists
The usual append predicate on finite lists can be encoded as the inductive definition
Associativity of append is stated formally as
Proving this formula requires us to prove first that the definition of append is functional, that is,
This is done by induction on l 1 , i.e., we apply the IL rule on app l 1 l 2 l 3 , after the introduction rules for ∀ and ⊃, of course. The invariant in this case is
It is a simple case analysis to check that this is the right invariant. Back to our original problem: after applying the introduction rules for the logical connectives in the formula, the problem of associativity is reduced to the following sequent
We then proceed by induction on the list l 1 , that is, we apply the IL rule to the hypothesis app l 1 l 2 l 12 . The invariant is simply
Applying the IL rule, followed by ∨L , to sequent (1) reduces the sequent to the following sub-goals
The proof for the second sequent is straightforward. The first sequent reduces to
This follows from the functionality of append and IR . The third sequent follows by case analysis. Of course, these proofs could have been simplified by using a derived principle of structural induction. While this is easy to do, we have preferred here to use the primitive IL rule.
Infinite lists
The append predicate on infinite lists is defined via co-recursion, that is, we define the behavior of destructor operations on lists (i.e., taking the head and the tail of the list). In this case we never construct explicitly the result of appending two lists, rather the head and the tail of the resulting lists are computed as needed. The co-recursive append requires case analysis on all arguments.
The corresponding associativity property is stated analogously to the inductive one and the main statement reduces to proving the sequent coapp
We apply the CIR rule to coapp l 1 l 23 l 4 , using the simulation
Subsequent steps of the proof involve mainly case analysis on coapp l 12 l 3 l 4 . As in the inductive case, we have to prove the sub-cases when l 12 is nil. However, unlike in the former case, case analysis on the arguments of coapp suffices.
Properties of derivations
We discuss several properties of derivations in Linc − . Some of them involve transformations on derivations which will be used extensively in the cut-elimination proof in Section 5. Before we proceed, some remarks on the use of eigenvariables in derivations are useful. In proof search involving ∀R , ∃L IL , CIR or eqL , new eigenvariables can be introduced in the premises of the rules. Let us refer to such variables as internal eigenvariables, since they occur only in the premise derivations. We view the choice of such eigenvariables as arbitrary and therefore we identify derivations that differ only in the choice of the eigenvariables introduced by those rules. Another way to look at it is to consider eigenvariables as proof-level binders. Hence when we work with a derivation, we actually work with an equivalence class of derivations modulo renaming of internal eigenvariables.
Instantiating derivations
The following definition extends substitutions to apply to derivations. Since we identify derivations that differ only in the choice of variables that are not free in the end-sequent, we will assume that such variables are chosen to be distinct from the variables in the domain of the substitution and from the free variables of the range of the substitution. Thus applying a substitution to a derivation will only affect the variables free in the end-sequent.
Definition 3.
If Π is a derivation of Γ −→ C and θ is a substitution, then we define the derivation Πθ of Γθ −→ Cθ as follows:
where sρ = βη tρ. Observe that any unifier for the pair (sθ,tθ) can be transformed to another unifier for (s,t), by composing the unifier with θ. Thus Πθ is
where sθρ ′ = βη tθρ ′ . 2. If Π ends with any other rule and has premise derivations Π 1 , . . . , Π n , then Πθ also ends with the same rule and has premise derivations Π 1 θ, . . . , Π n θ.
Among the premises of the inference rules of Linc − , certain premises share the same right-hand side formula with the sequent in the conclusion. We refer to such premises as major premises. This notion of major premise will be useful in proving cut-elimination, as certain proof transformations involve only major premises.
Definition 4.
Given an inference rule R with one or more premise sequents, we define its major premise sequents as follows.
If R is either ⊃ L , mc or IL , then its rightmost premise is the major premise 2. If R is CIR then its left premise is the major premise. 3. Otherwise, all the premises of R are major premises. A minor premise of a rule R is a premise of R which is not a major premise. The definition extends to derivations by replacing premise sequents with premise derivations.
The following two measures on derivations will be useful later in proving many properties of the logic. Given a set of measures S , we denote with lub(S ) the least upper bound of S .
Definition 5. Given a derivation Π with premise derivations
{Π i } i , the measure ht(Π) is lub({ht(Π i )} i ) + 1.
Definition 6. Given a derivation Π with premise derivations {Π i } i , the measure indm(Π) is defined as follows
Note that given the possible infinite branching of eqL rule, these measures in general can be ordinals. Therefore in proofs involving induction on those measures, transfinite induction is needed. However, in most of the inductive proofs to follow, we often do case analysis on the last rule of a derivation. In such a situation, the inductive cases for both successor ordinals and limit ordinals are basically covered by the case analysis on the inference figures involved, and we shall not make explicit use of transfinite induction.
Lemma 1. For any substitution θ and derivation
Proof. This lemma states that Definition 3 is well-constructed, and follows by induction on ht(Π). Proof. By induction on the measure ht(Π). ⊓ ⊔
Atomic initial rule
It is a common property of most logics that the initial rule can be restricted to atomic form, that is, the rule
where p is a predicate symbol. The more general rule is derived as follows.
Definition 7. We construct a derivation Id C of the sequent C −→ C inductively as follows. The induction is on the size of C. If C is an atomic formula we simply apply the atomic initial rule. Otherwise, we apply the left and right introduction rules for the topmost logical constant in C, probably with some instances of the contraction and the weakening rule.
The proof of the following lemma is straightforward by induction on ht(Id C ).
Lemma 4. For any formula C, it holds that indm(Id
Restricting the initial rule to atomic form will simplify some technical definitions to follow. We shall use Id instead of Id C to denote identity derivations since the formula C is always known from context. 
Suppose Π ends with init
p t −→ p t init . Then µ p C (Π, Π S ) is the derivation Π S B S x −→ S x Id S t −→ S t p t −→ S t IL 2. Suppose Π ends with ⊃ L Π 1 Γ ′ −→ D 1 Π 2 D 2 , Γ ′ −→ C D 1 ⊃ D 2 , Γ ′ −→ C ⊃ L Then µ p C (Π, Π S ) is the derivation Π 1 Γ ′ −→ D 1 µ p C (Π 2 , Π S ) D 2 , Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] D 1 ⊃ D 2 , Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] ⊃ L 3. Suppose Π ends with ⊃ R Π ′ Γ,C 1 −→ C 2 Γ −→ C 1 ⊃ C 2 ⊃ R
Note that since p dominates C, it must be the case that p does not occur in C
1 . The derivation µ(Π, Π S ) is then defined as follows. µ p C 2 (Π ′ , Π S ) Γ,C 1 −→ C 2 [S/p] Γ −→ C 1 ⊃ C 2 [S/p] ⊃ R 4. Suppose Π ends with mc Π 1 ∆ 1 −→ B 1 . . . Π m ∆ m −→ B m Π ′ B 1 , . . . , B m , Γ ′ −→ C ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ m , Γ ′ −→ C mc Then µ p C (Π, Π S ) is Π 1 ∆ 1 −→ B 1 . . . Π m ∆ m −→ B m µ p C (Π ′ , Π S ) B 1 , . . . , B m , Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ m , Γ ′ −→ C[S/p]Ψ D I z −→ I z Π ′ I t, Γ ′ −→ C q t, Γ ′ −→ C IL Then µ p C (Π, Π S ) is the derivation Ψ D I z −→ I z µ p C (Π ′ , Π S ) I t, Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] q t, Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] IL 6. Suppose Π ends with IR Π ′ Γ −→ B p t Γ −→ p t IR . Then µ p C (Π, Π S ) is the derivation µ p B p (Π ′ , Π S ) Γ −→ B S t Π S [ t/ x] B S t −→ S t Γ −→ S t mc.
If Π ends with any other rules, and has premise derivations
for some index set I , then µ p C (Π, Π S ) also ends with the same rule and has premise derivations {µ Let C be a formula dominated by p, and let Π be a derivation of 
Note that since p dominates C, it must be the case that p is vacuous in C 1 . Therefore we construct the derivation ν
p C (Π, Π S ) as follows. ν p C 2 (Π ′ , Π S ) Γ,C 1 −→ C 2 Γ −→ C 1 ⊃ C 2 ⊃ R 3. Suppose Π ends with mc Π 1 ∆ 1 −→ B 1 . . . Π m ∆ m −→ B m Π ′ B 1 , . . . , B m , Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ m , Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] mc Then ν p C (Π, Π S ) is Π 1 ∆ 1 −→ B 1 . . . Π m ∆ m −→ B m ν p C (Π ′ , Π S ) B 1 , . . . , B m , Γ ′ −→ C ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ m , Γ ′ −→ CΨ D I z −→ I z Π ′ I t, Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] q t, Γ ′ −→ C[S/p] IL Then ν p C (Π, Π S ) is the derivation Ψ D I z −→ I z ν p C (Π ′ , Π S ) I t, Γ ′ −→ C q t, Γ ′ −→ C IL
If Π ends with any other rules, and has premise derivations
for some index set I , then ν p C (Π, Π S ) also ends with the same rule and has premise derivations {ν
The following two lemmas state that substitutions commute with unfolding of derivations. Their proofs follow straightforwardly from the fact that the definitions of (co-)inductive unfolding depend only on the logical structures of conclusions of sequents, hence is orthogonal to substitutions of eigenvariables. In these lemmas, we assume that the formulas C, p and derivations Π and Π S satisfy the conditions of Definition 8 and Definition 9. 
Cut elimination for Linc
− A central result of our work is cut-elimination, from which consistency of the logic follows. Gentzen's classic proof of cut-elimination for first-order logic uses an induction on the size of the cut formula, i.e., the number of logical connectives in the formula. The cut-elimination procedure consists of a set of reduction rules that reduce a cut of a compound formula to cuts on its sub-formulae of smaller size. In the case of Linc − , the use of induction/co-induction complicates the reduction of cuts. Consider for example a cut involving the induction rules
There are at least two problems in reducing this cut. First, any permutation upwards of the cut will necessarily involve a cut with S that can be of larger size than p, and hence a simple induction on the size of cut formula will not work. Second, the invariant S does not appear in the conclusion of the left premise of the cut. The latter means that we need to transform the left premise so that its end sequent will agree with the right premise. Any such transformation will most likely be global, and hence simple induction on the height of derivations will not work either. We shall use the reducibility techniques to prove cut elimination. More specifically, we shall build on the notion of reducibility introduced by Martin-Löf to prove normalization of an intuitionistic logic with iterative inductive definition [24] . Martin-Löf's proof has been adapted to sequent calculus by McDowell and Miller [25] , but in a restricted setting where only natural number induction is allowed. Since our logic involves arbitrary stratified inductive definitions, which also includes iterative inductive definitions, we shall need a more general cut reductions. But the real difficulty in our case is really in establishing cut elimination in the presence of co-inductive definitions, for which there is no known cut elimination proof for the sequent calculus formulation.
The main part of the reducibility technique is a definition of the family of reducible sets of derivations. In MartinLöf's theory of iterative inductive definition, this family of sets is defined inductively by the level of the derivations they contain. Extending this definition of reducibility to Linc − is not obvious. In particular, in establishing the reducibility of a derivation Ξ ending with a CIR rule:
one must first establish the reducibility of its premise derivations. But a naive definition of reducibility for Ξ, i.e., a definition that postulates the reducibility of Ξ from the reducibility of its premises, is not a monotone definition, since the premise derivations of Ξ may be derivations that have a higher level than Ξ.
To define a proper notion of reducibility for the co-inductive cases, we use a notion of parametric reducibility, similar to that used in the strong normalisation proof of System F [19] . The notion of a parameter in our case is essentially a coinductive predicate. As with strong normalisation of System F, these parameters are substituted with some "reducibility candidates", which in our case are certain sets of derivations of a co-inductive invariant which we call saturated sets. Let us say that a derivation Ψ has type B if its end sequent is of the form Γ −→ B, for some Γ. Roughly, a parametric reducibility set of type C, under a parameter substitution [S/p], where p is a co-inductive predicate and S is an invariant of the same type as S, is a certain set of derivations of type C[S/p] satisfying some closure conditions which are very similar to the definition of reducibility sets, but without the co-inductive part. The definition of reducibility in the case involving co-induction rules, e.g., as in the derivation Ξ above, can then be defined in terms parametric reducibility sets, under appropriate parameter substitutions. Details of the definition will be given later in this section.
Cut reduction
We follow the idea of Martin-Löf in using derivations directly as a measure by defining a well-founded ordering on them. The basis for the latter relation is a set of reduction rules (called the contraction rules in [24] ) that are used to eliminate the applications of the cut rule. For the cases involving logical connectives, the cut-reduction rules used to prove the cut-elimination for Linc − are the same to those of FOλ ∆IN . The crucial differences are in the reduction rules involving induction and co-induction rules. For simplicity of presentation, we always show i = 1.
Definition 10. We define a reduction relation between derivations. The redex is always a derivation Ξ ending with the multicut rule
Π 1 ∆ 1 −→ B 1 · · · Π n ∆ n −→ B n Π B 1 , . . . , B n , Γ −→ C ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n , Γ −→ C mc
Essential cases:
The case for the other ∧L rule is symmetric.
The case for the other ∨R rule is symmetric. 
Then by the definition of eqR rule, s and t are equal terms (modulo λ-conversion), and hence are unifiable by the empty substitution. Note that in this case Π ε ∈ {Π ρ } ρ . Therefore Ξ reduces to • 
where p x
where •R is any right rule except CIR , then Ξ reduces to
where p x 
where I 1 , . . . , I m , I ′ partition the formulas {B i } i∈{1..n} among the premise derivations
Structural cases: 
If Π ends with the init rule, then n = 1, Γ is the empty multiset, and C must be a cut formula, i.e., C = B 1 . Therefore Ξ reduces to Π 1 .
Notice that the reductions in the essential case for induction and co-induction are not symmetric. This is because we use an asymmetric measure to show the termination of cut-reduction, that is, the complexity of cut is always reduced on the right premise. The difficulty in getting a symmetric measure, in the presence of contraction and implication (in the body of definition), is already observed in logics with definitions but without (co-)induction [49] .
It is clear from an inspection of the rules of the logic and the definition of cut reduction that every derivation ending with a multicut has a reduct. But because we use multisets in sequents, there may be some ambiguity as to whether a formula occurring on the left side of the rightmost premise of a multicut rule is in fact a cut formula, and if so, which of the left premises corresponds to it. As a result, several of the reduction rules may apply, and so a derivation may have multiple redexes.
The following lemmas show that the reduction relation is preserved by some of the transformations of derivations defined previously. Proof. Observe that the redexes of a derivation are not affected by substitution, since the cut reduction rules are determined by the last rules of the premise derivations of the derivation, which are not changed by substitution. Therefore, any cut reduction rule that is applied to Πθ to get Ξ can also be applied to Π. Suppose that Π ′ is the reduct of Π obtained this way. In all cases, except for the cases where the reduction rule applied is either * /IL or CIL /CIR , it is a matter of routine to check that Π ′ θ = Ξ. For the reduction rules * /IL and CIL /CIR , we need Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 which show that substitution commutes with (co-)inductive unfolding.
⊓ ⊔ Proof. By case analysis on the reduction rules. The case analysis can be much simplified by the following observations. First, the reduction rules are driven only by outermost connectives in the formulas in the sequent. Second, the unfolding of a derivation affects only the right-hand-side of the sequents appearing in the derivation (or more specifically, only the branches containing major premises). By a quick inspection on the definition of reduction rules in Definition 10, we see that the only non-trivial case to consider is the right-commutative case −/ • R . Since C is non-atomic (and assuming that it has at least one occurrence of p, otherwise it is trivial since Π = µ p C (Π, Π S ) in this case), the only cases we need to verify is when its topmost logical connective is either ∧, ∨, ⊃, ∀ and ∃. In these cases, the unfolding does not change the topmost connective, therefore any reduction rule that applies to µ(Π, Π S ) also applies to Π. Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 are used when substitutions are involved (right/left commutative cases with eqL ).
Lemma 8. Let p x µ = D p x be an inductive definition and let Π S be a derivation of D S x −→ S x for some invariant S. Let C be a non-atomic formula dominated by p. Let
⊓ ⊔ Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 8. ⊓ ⊔
Lemma 9. Let p x µ = D p x be an inductive definition and let Π S be a derivation of D S x −→ S x for some invariant S. Let Π be the derivation
Π 1 ∆ 1 −→ B 1 · · · Π n ∆ n −→ B n Π ′ B 1 , . . . , B n , Γ −→ p t ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n , Γ −→ p t
Normalizability
Definition 11. We define the set of normalizable derivations to be the smallest set that satisfies the following conditions:
If a derivation Π ends with a multicut, then it is normalizable if every reduct of Π is normalizable. 2. If a derivation ends with any rule other than a multicut, then it is normalizable if the premise derivations are normalizable.
Following Martin-Löf [24] , instead of assigning some ordinal measures to derivations and define an ordering on them, we shall use the derivation figures themselves as a measure. Each clause in the definition of normalizability asserts that a derivation is normalizable if certain (possibly infinitely many) other derivations are normalizable. We call the latter the predecessors of the former. Thus a derivation is normalizable if the tree of its successive predecessors is well-founded. We refer to this well-founded tree as its normalization.
Since a normalization is well-founded, it has an associated induction principle: for any property P of derivations, if for every derivation Π in the normalization, P holds for every predecessor of Π implies that P holds for Π, then P holds for every derivation in the normalization.
The set of all normalizable derivations is denoted by NM.
Lemma 11. If there is a normalizable derivation of a sequent, then there is a cut-free derivation of the sequent.
Proof. Let Π be a normalizable derivation of the sequent Γ −→ B. We show by induction on the normalization of Π that there is a cut-free derivation of Γ −→ B.
If Π ends with a multicut, then any of its reducts is one of its predecessors and so is normalizable. But the reduct
is also a derivation of Γ −→ B , so by the induction hypothesis this sequent has a cut-free derivation.
2. Suppose Π ends with a rule other than multicut. Since we are given that Π is normalizable, by definition the premise derivations are normalizable. These premise derivations are the predecessors of Π, so by the induction hypothesis there are cut-free derivations of the premises. Thus there is a cut-free derivation of Γ −→ B .
⊓ ⊔
The next lemma states that normalization is closed under substitutions.
Lemma 12. If Π is a normalizable derivation, then for any substitution θ, Πθ is normalizable.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the normalization of Π.
1. If Π ends with a multicut, then Πθ also ends with a multicut. By Lemma 7 every reduct of Πθ corresponds to a reduct of Π, therefore by induction hypothesis every reduct of Πθ is normalizable, and hence Πθ is normalizable. 2. Suppose Π ends with a rule other than multicut and has premise derivations {Π i }. By Definition 3 each premise derivation in Πθ is either Π i or Π i θ. Since Π is normalizable, Π i is normalizable, and so by the induction hypothesis Π i θ is also normalizable. Thus Πθ is normalizable. ⊓ ⊔
Parametric reducibility
Let us first define some terminology concerning derivations. We say that a derivation Π has type C if the end sequent of Π is of the form Γ −→ C for some Γ. We say that a set of derivations S has type C, if every derivation Π ∈ S has type C. A set of derivations R is closed under substitution if for every Π ∈ R and for every substitution θ, Πθ ∈ R .
To simplify presentation, we shall use the following notations to denote certain types of derivations. The derivation
is abbreviated as mc(Π 1 , . . . , Π n , Π). The derivation
is abbreviated as ind(Π S , Π), and the derivation
is abbreviated as coind(Π, Π S ).
Definition 12. Let F be a closed term of type α 1 → · · · → α n → o. A set of derivations S is said to be F-indexed if every derivation in S has type F t 1 . . .t n for some t 1 , . . . ,t n .
Given a set S of derivations and a formula C, we denote with S ↓ C the set {Π ∈ S | Π is of type C }.
We shall now define a family of sets of derivations, which we call parametric reducibility sets. From now on, when we write RED p C [R , S ], it is understood that p is a co-inductive predicate, C is dominated by p, R is a set of derivations, and S is an I-indexed set of normalizable derivations, for some I.
If p does not appear in C then
RED p C [R , S ] = R ↓ C .
If C = p u, for some u, then RED
p C [R , S ] = S ↓ I u .
Otherwise, the family of parametric reducibility sets {RED
Note that in Definition 13 (3), we define simultaneously the reducibility sets RED P Cθ [R , S ] for all substitution θ. This is because in the case the derivation Π ends with eqL , reducibility of Π may depend on the reducibility of (possibly infinitely many) derivations which are in RED p Cρ [R , S ] for some ρ. Since Cρ is of the same size as Cθ, its parametric reducibility set may not yet be defined by induction on the size. We therefore need to define this and other reducibility sets which are indexed by instances of C simultaneously.
As with the definition of normalizability, clause (3) in Definition 13 defines a monotone fixed point operator (assuming the parametric reducibility sets of smaller types have been fixed), and it therefore induces a well-founded tree of derivations in the family {RED We shall call the well-founded tree of successive predecessors of a derivation Π in the family {RED p Cθ [R , S ]} θ the parametric reduction of Π. As with the normalization of a derivation, it has an associated induction principle. Note that, however, this ordering on derivations is defined only in the case where C satisfies the syntactic condition defined in Definition 13(3), i.e., it contains at least an occurrence of p and is not an atomic formula.
The definition of parametric reducibility can be seen as defining a function on S-indexed sets. In the case where the type of the parametric reducibility set is the body of the co-inductive definition for p, this function corresponds to the underlying fixed point operator for p. We shall now define a class of S-indexed sets which are closed under this fixed point operator. These sets, called saturated sets in the following, can be seen as post-fixed points of the fixed point operator for the co-inductive definition for p. They will be used in defining the reducibility of derivations involving the co-induction rule CIR . 
Reducibility
We now define a family of reducible sets RED i of level i. 
Π ends with mc and all its reducts are in
, and for every substitution θ and for every derivation As in the definition of normalizability, each clause in the definition of reducibility asserts that a derivation is reducible provided that certain other derivations, called the predecessors of the derivation, are reducible. The definition of reducibility induces a well-founded ordering on derivations in the reducibility sets. We shall refer to this ordering as reducibility ordering and the induced well-founded tree as the reduction of the derivation. We say that a derivation is reducible if it is in RED i for some i.
Lemma 13. Every reducible derivation is normalizable.
Proof. Given a reducible derivation Π, it is straightforward to show by induction on its reduction that it is normalizable. In the case where Π ends with CIR , by the definition of saturated sets (Definition 14) and reducibility (Definition 15), its premise derivations are normalizable, and therefore Π is also normalizable.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 14. If Π is reducible then for every derivation θ, Πθ is also reducible.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the reduction of Π. We consider two non-trivial cases here: the case where Π ends with mc and the case where it ends with CIR . For the former, suppose that Π = mc(Π 1 , . . . , Π n , Π ′ ). By Lemma 7, every reduct of Πθ, say Ξ, is the result of substituting a reduct of Π. By induction hypothesis, every reduct of Πθ is reducible, hence Πθ is also reducible. We now consider the case Π ends with CIR , i.e., Π is
where p x ν = B p x. Let i be the level of p and let R = S {RED j | j < lvl(p)}. By the definition of reducibility, we have that Π ′ and Π S are both normalizable, and moreover, there exists a (R , Π S )-saturated set S , such that Π ′ ∈ S .
Suppose that u = ( t)θ. To show that Πθ is reducible, we must first show that both Π ′ θ and Π S are normalizable. This is straightforward from the fact that both Π ′ and Π S are normalizable and that normalisation is closed under substitutions (Lemma 12). It remains to show that there exists a (R , Π S )-saturated set S ′ such that Π ′ θ ∈ S ′ . Let S ′ = S . Since saturated sets are closed under substitution and Π ′ ∈ S ′ , we have Π ′ θ ∈ S ′ .
⊓ ⊔
Lemma 15. Let p be a co-inductive predicate, let S be a closed term of the same type as p. Let
R = S {RED j | j < lvl(p)}, let S = [
{Ξ | Ξ is reducible and has type S t for some t} and let C be a formula dominated by p. Then for every reducible derivation Π of type C[S/p], Π ∈ RED
Proof. By induction on the reduction of Π. If p does not occur in C then Π ∈ R , since in this case lvl(C) < lvl(p)
The other cases follow from straightforwardly from induction hypothesis. We show here the case where Π ends with ⊃ R .
Note that in this case C = B ⊃ D, and p does not occur in B by the restriction on C (p dominates C). Since Π is reducible, we have that Π ′ is a reducible predecessor of Π, and for every substitution θ and every reducible derivation Ξ of type Bθ, we have mc(Ξ, Π ′ θ) is also a reducible predecessor of Π. It thus follows from induction hypotheses 
⊓ ⊔
Reducibility of unfolded derivations
The following lemmas state that reducibility is preserved by (co)inductive unfolding, under certain assumptions. 
Then the derivation µ
Proof. By induction on the reduction of Π. We show the non-trivial cases, assuming that p is not vacuous in C. To simplify presentation, we shall write µ(., .) instead of µ p F (., .), since in each of the following cases, it is easy to infer from the context which F we are referring to.
1. Suppose Π ends with init rule on p u. Then µ(Π, Π S ) = ind(Π S , Id S u ), which is reducible by assumption.
Suppose Π ends with
. By the definition of reducibility, the derivation Π ′ is reducible and for every substitution θ and every reducible derivation
is reducible. We want to show that the derivation µ(Π, Π S )
is reducible. This reduces to showing that µ(Π ′ , Π S ) is reducible and that
is reducible. The first follows from induction hypothesis on Π ′ . For the second derivation, we know from Lemma 5 that
It follows from this and the definition of inductive unfolding (Definition 8) that
We can apply induction hypothesis on Ξ, since it is a predecessor of Π, to establish the reducibility of µ(Ξ, Π S ). This, together with reducibility of µ(Π ′ , Π S ) implies that µ(Π, Π S ) is reducible. 3. Suppose Π ends with IR rule on p u.
The derivation µ(Π ′ , Π S ) is reducible by induction hypothesis. This, together with assumption (1) of the lemma, imply that µ(Π, Π S ) is reducible.
4. Suppose Π ends with mc.
By the definition of reducibility, every reduct of Π is reducible. We need to show that every reduct of µ(Π, Π S ) is reducible. From Lemma 8, we know that for the case where C is not atomic every reduct of µ(Π, Π S ) corresponds to some reduct of Π. Similarly, for the case where Π ′ ends with a rule other than init or IR , by Lemma 9, the reducts of µ(Π, Π S ) are in one-to-one correspondence with the reducts of Π. Therefore in these cases, the inductive hypothesis can be applied to show the reducibility of each reduct of µ(Π, Π S ). This leaves us the following two cases, where C = p u and Π ′ ends with either IR or init rules.
is a reduct of Π (by the reduction rule −/IR ), and therefore by the definition of reducibility both this reduct and Ξ 1 are reducible predecessors of Π. Let Ψ be the derivation
Then the derivation µ(Π, Π S ) is the following
The only applicable reduction rule to µ(Π, Π S ) is −/mc, which gives us the reduct Ξ
where Ψ ′ is the derivation
Notice that Ψ ′ is exactly µ(Ξ 1 , Π S ), and is reducible by inductive hypothesis. Therefore assumption (1) applies, and the reduct Ξ is reducible, hence µ(Π, Π S ) is also reducible.
-Otherwise, suppose Π ′ ends with init, then D 1 = p u and Π is the derivation
The only reduct of Π is Π 1 since the only applicable reduction is −/init. On the other hand, the derivation µ(Π, Π S ) is
The derivation µ(Π 1 , Π S ) is reducible by inductive hypothesis (Π 1 is a predecessor of Π) and assumption (2) applies, and the above reduct is reducible. 
Proof. By induction on the size of C, with sub-induction on the parametric reduction of Π. As in the proof of inductive unfolding, we omit the subscript and superscript in the ν function to simplify the presentation of the proof.
If p is not free in
, it follows from the definition of parametric reducibility that Π ∈ R , hence it is reducible by assumption.
Suppose
To show that this derivation is reducible, we first show that there exist a (R ,
, by the definition of parametric reducibility, we have Π ∈ S . Let S ′ = S . Then S ′ is indeed a (R , Π S )-saturated set containing Π. It remains to show that both Π and Π S are normalizable. This follows from the assumption on Π S and the fact that saturated sets contain only normalizable derivations. 3. Suppose p occurs in C but C = p u for any u. There are several subcases, depending on the last rule in Π. Then we show by induction on parametric reducibility of Π that it is also reducible.
(a) The base cases are those where Π ends with a rule with empty premises and where Π ends with a rightintroduction rule. In the former case, its reducibility is immediate from the definition of reducibility (Definition 15). For the latter, in most cases, the reducibility of Π follows from the outer induction hypothesis (since in this case, the premise derivations of Π are in the parametric reducibility sets of smaller types) and Definition 15. We show here a non-trivial case involving implication-right: Suppose Π ends with ⊃ R , i.e.,
To show that ν(Π, Π S ) is reducible, we need to show that ν(Π ′ , Π S ) is reducible, and for every θ and every
The parametric reducibility of Π implies that Π ′ ∈ RED C 2 [R , S ] and for every θ and every derivation
Note that Ψ is in R since lvl(C 1 θ) < lvl(p). Therefore we also have
By the outer induction hypothesis, we have that both
are reducible. It remains to show that the mc(Ψ, ν(Π ′ , Π S )θ) is reducible. Note that by Lemma 6 this derivation is equivalent to mc(Ψ, ν(Π ′ θ, Π S )). To show that this derivation is reducible, there are two cases to consider. If C 2 is non-atomic then it is easy to see that mc(Ψ, ν(Π ′ θ, Π S )) is equivalent to ν(mc(Ψ, Π ′ θ), Π S ), which is reducible by the outer induction hypothesis. If, however, C 2 = p u for some u, then mc(Ψ, ν(Π ′ θ, Π S )) is the derivation (supposing that the end sequent of Ψ is ∆ −→ C 1 θ):
To show that this derivation is reducible, we must show that all its reducts are reducible. There is only one reduction rule that is applicable in this case, i.e., the −/CIR -case, which leads to the following derivation:
But notice that this is exactly the derivation ν(mc(Ψ, Π ′ θ), Π S ), which is reducible by the outer induction hypothesis.
Having shown that ν(Π ′ , Π S ) and mc(Ψ, ν(Π ′ , Π S )θ) are reducible, we have sufficient conditions to conclude that ν(Π, Π S ) is indeed reducible. (b) For the inductive cases, Π ends either with mc or a left-rule. We show the former case here (the other cases are straightforward). Suppose Π is
The derivation ν(Π, Π S ) is reducible if every reduct of ν(Π, Π S ) is also reducible. From Lemma10, it follows that every reduct of ν(Π, Π S ) is of the form ν(Ξ, Π S ) where Ξ is a reduct of Π. Since all reducts of Π are predecessors of Π in the parametric reducibility ordering, we can apply the inductive hypothesis to show that every reduct of ν(Π, Π S ) is reducible, hence ν(Π, Π S ) is also reducible. ⊓ ⊔
Cut elimination
Most cases in the cut elimination proof for Linc − in the following are similar to those of FOλ ∆IN . The crucial differences are in the handling of the essential cut reductions for inductive and co-inductive rules. 4 In the case of derivations of inductive predicates, a crucial part of the proof is in establishing that the S-indexed set of reducible derivations (where S is an inductive invariant) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 16 (in effect, demonstrating that the said set forms a pre-fixed point). Dually, in the case for co-inductive proofs, one must show that the S-indexed set of reducible derivations, where S is a co-inductive invariant, forms a saturated set (i.e., a post fixed point of the co-inductive definition involved). For any derivation Π of B 1 , . . . , B n , Γ −→ C, for any reducible derivations
Lemma 18.
where n ≥ 0, and for any substitutions δ 1 , . . . , δ n , γ such that B i δ i = B i γ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the derivation Ξ
Proof. The proof is by induction on indm(Π) with subordinate induction on ht(Π), on n and on the reductions of Π 1 , . . . , Π n . The proof does not rely on the order of the inductions on reductions. Thus when we need to distinguish one of the Π i , we shall refer to it as Π 1 without loss of generality. The derivation Ξ is reducible if all its reducts are reducible. If n = 0, then Ξ reduces to Πγ, thus in this case we show that Πγ is reducible. Since reducibility is preserved by substitution (Lemma 14), it is enough to show that Π is reducible. This is proved by a case analysis of the last rule in Π. For each case, the result follows easily from the induction hypothesis on ht(Π) and Definition 15. The ⊃ R case requires that substitution for variables does not increase the measures of a derivation. In the cases for ⊃ L and IL we need the additional information that reducibility implies normalizability (Lemma 13). The case for CIR requires special attention. Let p x ν = D p x be a co-inductive definition. Suppose Π is the derivation
To show that Π is reducible we must show that its premises are normalizable and that there exists a (R , Π S )-saturated set S such that Π ′ ∈ S . The former follows from the outer induction hypothesis and Lemma 13. For the latter, the set S is defined as follows:
Property (1) follows from the fact that reducibility implies normalizability (Lemma 13). Property (2) follows from the fact that reducibility is closed under substitution (Lemma 14). To prove (3), first notice that by Lemma 2, indm( ⊃ R / ⊃ L : Suppose Π 1 and Π are
is reducible by induction hypothesis since indm(Π ′ ) ≤ indm(Π) and ht(Π ′ ) < ht(Π). Since Π 1 is reducible, by Definition 15 the derivation
is a predecessor of Π 1 and therefore is reducible. The reduct of Ξ in this case is the following derivation
which is reducible by induction hypothesis and Definition 15. ∀L /∀R : Suppose Π 1 and Π are
Since we identify derivations that differ only in the choice of intermediate eigenvariables that are not free in the end sequents, we can choose a variable y such that it is not free in the domains and ranges of δ 1 and γ. We assume without loss of generality that x is chosen to be fresh with respect to the free variables in the substitutions so we can push the substitutions under the binder. The derivation Ξ is thus
which is reducible by induction hypothesis.
eqR /eqL : Suppose Π 1 and Π are
Then Ξ is the derivation
The eqR tells us that s and t are unifiable via empty substitution (i.e., they are the same normal terms). The reduct of
is therefore reducible by induction hypothesis.
Let p u be the result of applying δ 1 to p t. Then Ξ is the derivation
Notice that we have used the fact that
in the derivation above, which follows from Lemma 5. Therefore, in order to prove that Ξ ′ is reducible, it remains to show that the unfolding of Π 1 produces a reducible derivation. This will be proved using Lemma 16, but we shall first prove the following properties, which are the conditions for applying Lemma 16:
For every reducible derivation Ψ of ∆ −→ S u the derivation mc(Ψ, Id S u ) is reducible. 3. The derivation ind(Π S , Id S u ) is reducible, for every u of the appropriate types. To prove (1), we observe that indm(Π S [ u/ x]) ≤ indm(Π S ) < indm(Π), so by the outer induction hypothesis, the derivation mc(µ(Ξ, Π S ), Π S [ u/ x]) is reducible. Property (2) is proved similarly, by observing that indm(Id S u ) < indm(Π) (since identity derivations do not use the IL rule; c.f. Lemma 4). Property (3) follows from the fact that Id S u is reducible and that Π S is reducible (hence, also normalizable). Having shown these three properties, using Lemma 16 we conclude that µ(Π 1 , Π S ) is reducible, hence, by the outer induction (Π ′ is smaller than Π), the reduct Ξ ′ is reducible. CIR /CIL : Suppose Π 1 and Π are
It then follows from Lemma 17 that
The reduct of Ξ is the derivation
Its reducibility follows from the reducibility of ν(Ξ 1 , Π S ) and the outer induction hypothesis.
Since Π 1 is reducible, it follows from Definition 15 that Π ′ 1 is normalizable and Π ′′ 1 is reducible. Let Ξ 1 be the derivation 
1 is normalizable and substitutions preserve normalizability, by Definition 11 the left premise of the reduct is normalizable, and hence the reduct is reducible.
Notice that each premise derivation Π δ 1 •ρ ′ of Π 1 δ 1 is a also a premise derivation of Π 1 , since for every unifier ρ ′ of (s = t)δ 1 , there is a unifier of s = t, i.e., the substitution δ 1 • ρ ′ . Therefore every Π δ 1 •ρ ′ is a predecessor of Π 1 . Let Ξ ρ ′ be the derivation
IL
Since Π 1 is reducible, it follows from the definition of reducibility that Π ′ 1 is reducible predecessor of Π 1 and Π S is normalizable. Suppose p u = (p t)δ 1 = (p t)γ. Let Ξ 1 be the derivation
and Ξ 2 be
Both Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 are reducible by induction hypothesis. Therefore the reduct of
is reducible (reducibility of Ξ 1 implies its normalizability by Lemma 12) .
The derivations Π ′ γ, Π S , Ξ 1 and the derivation
where Ψ is any reducible derivation, are all reducible by induction hypothesis on the length of Π. Again, we use the same arguments as in the case where n = 0 to construct a (R , Π S )-saturated set S such that Ξ 1 ∈ S . Therefore by Definition 15, the reduct of Ξ:
mc/ • L : Suppose Π 1 ends with a mc. Then any reduct of Π 1 δ 1 corresponds to a predecessor of Π 1 by Lemma 7.
Therefore the reduct of Ξ is reducible by induction on the reduction of Π 1 . −/init: Ξ reduces to Π 1 δ 1 . Since Π 1 is reducible, by Lemma 14, Π 1 δ 1 is reducible and hence Ξ is reducible.
⊓ ⊔
Corollary 1. Every derivation is reducible.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 18, by setting n = 0. ⊓ ⊔ Since reducibility implies cut-elimination, it follows that every proof can be transformed into a cut-free proof.
Corollary 2. Given a fixed stratified definition, a sequent has a proof in Linc − if and only if it has a cut-free proof.
The consistency of Linc − is an immediate consequence of cut-elimination. By consistency we mean the following: given a fixed stratified definition and an arbitrary formula C, it is not the case that both C and C ⊃ ⊥ are provable.
Corollary 3. The logic Linc
− is consistent.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, that is, there is a formula C such that there is a proof Π 1 of C and another proof Π 2 for C ⊃ ⊥. Since cut elimination holds, we can assume, without loss of generality, that Π 1 and Π 2 are cut free. By inspection of the inference rules of Linc − , we see that Π 2 must end with ⊃ R , that is, Π 2 is
Cutting Π 1 with Π ′ 2 we get a derivation of · −→ ⊥, and applying the cut-elimination procedure we get a cut-free derivation of · −→ ⊥. But there cannot be such a derivation since there is no right-introduction rule for ⊥, contradiction.
Related Work
Of course, there is a long association between mathematical logic and inductive definitions [2] and in particular with proof-theory, starting with the Takeuti's conjecture, the earliest relevant entry for our purposes being Martin-Löf's original formulation of the theory of iterated inductive definitions [24] . From the impredicative encoding of inductive types [7] and the introduction of (co)recursion [16, 29] in system F, (co)inductive types became common and made it into type-theoretic proof assistants such as Coq [37] , first via a primitive recursive operator, but eventually in the let-rec style of functional programming languages, as in Gimenez's Calculus of Infinite Constructions [18] ; here termination (resp. productivity) is ensured by a syntactic check known as guarded by destructors [17] . Note that Coq forbids altogether the introduction of blocks of mutually dependent types containing both inductive and co-inductive ones, even though they could be stratified. Moreover, while a syntactic check has obvious advantages, it tends to be too restrictive, as observed and improved upon in [6] by using type based termination. The same can be said about Agda [36] , where size types termination will eventually supersede guardedness [28] . Baelde and Miller have recently introduced an extension of linear logic with least and greatest fixed points [5] . However, cut elimination is proved indirectly via a second-order encoding of the least and the greatest fixed point operators into higher-order linear logic and via an appeal to completeness of focused proofs for higher-order linear logic.
Circular proofs are also connected with the emerging proof-theory of of fixed point logics and process calculi [48, 55] , as well as in traditional sequent calculi such as in [8] . The issue is the equivalence between systems with local vs global induction, that is, between fixed point rules vs. well-founded and guarded induction (i.e. circular proofs). In the sequent calculus it is unknown whether every inductive proof can be obtained via global induction.
In higher order logic (co)inductive definitions are obtained via the usual Tarski fixed point constructions, as realized for example in Isabelle/HOL [38] . As we mentioned before, those approaches are at odd with HOAS even at the level of the syntax. This issue has originated a research field in its own that we can only try to mention the main contenders: in the Twelf system [41] the LF type theory is used to encode deductive systems as judgments and to specify metatheorems as relations (type families) among them; a logic programming-like interpretation provides an operational semantics to those relations, so that an external check for totality (incorporating termination, well-modedness and coverage [42, 53] ) verifies that the given relation is indeed a realizer for that theorem. Coinduction is still unaccounted for and may require a switch to a different operational semantics for LF. There exists a second approach to reasoning in LF that is built on the idea of devising an explicit (meta-)meta-logic (M ω ) for reasoning (inductively) about the framework, in a fully automated way [52] . It can be seen as a constructive first-order inductive type theory, whose quantifiers range over possibly open LF objects over a signature. In this calculus it is possible to express and inductively prove meta-logical properties of an object level system. M ω can be also seen as a dependently-typed functional programming language, and as such it has been refined first into the Elphin programming language [54] and more recently in Delphin [47] . In a similar vein the context modal logic of Pientka, Pfenning and Naneski [34] provides a basis for a different foundation for programming with HOAS and dependent types based on hereditary substitutions, see the programming language Beluga ( [43, 44] ). Because all of these systems are programming languages, we refrain from a deeper discussion. We only note that systems like Delphin or Beluga separate data from computations. This means they are always based on eager evaluation, whereas co-recursive functions should be interpreted lazily. Using standard techniques such as thunks to simulate lazy evaluation in such a context seems problematic (Pientka, personal communication) .
Weak higher-order abstract syntax [11] is an approach that strives to co-exist with an inductive setting, where the positivity condition for datatypes and hypothetical judgments must be obeyed. The problem of negative occurrences in datatypes is handled by replacing them with a new type. The approach is extended to hypothetical judgments by introducing distinct predicates for the negative occurrences. Some axioms are needed to reason about hypothetical judgments, to mimic what is inferred by the cut rule in our architecture. Miculan et al.'s framework [22] embraces this axiomatic approach extending Coq with the "theory of contexts" (ToC). The theory includes axioms for the the reification of key properties of names akin to freshness. Furthermore, higher-order induction and recursion schemata on expressions are also assumed. Hybrid [3] is a λ-calculus on top of Isabelle/HOL which provides the user with a Full HOAS syntax, compatible with a classical (co)-inductive setting. Linc − improves on the latter on several counts. First it disposes of Hybrid notion of abstraction, which is used to carve out the "parametric" function space from the full HOL space. Moreover it is not restricted to second-order abstract syntax, as the current Hybrid version is (and as ToC cannot escape from being). Finally, at higher types, reasoning via defL is more powerful than inversion, which does not exploit higher-order unification.
ToC can be seen as a stepping stone towards Gabbay and Pitts nominal logic, which aims to be a foundation of programming and reasoning with names. It can be presented as a first-order theory [45] , which includes primitives for variable renaming and variable freshness, and a (derived) new "freshness" quantifier. Using this theory, it is possible to prove properties by structural induction and also to define functions by recursion over syntax [46] . Urban et al. ' s have engineered a nominal datatype package inside Isabelle/HOL [35] analogous to the standard datatype package but defining equivalence classes of term constructors. In more recent versions, principles of primitive recursion and strong induction have been added [60] . Coinduction on nominal datatypes is not available, but to be fair it is also absent from Isabelle/HOL due to some technical limitations in the automation of the inductive package
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a proof theoretical treatment of both induction and co-induction in a sequent calculus compatible with HOAS encodings. The proof principle underlying the explicit proof rules is basically fixed point (co)induction. We have shown some examples where informal (co)inductive proofs using invariants and simulations are reproduced formally in Linc − . Consistency of the logic is an easy consequence of cut-elimination. Our proof system is, as far as we know, the first which incorporates a co-induction proof rule with a direct cut elimination proof. This schema can be used as a springboard towards cut elimination procedures for more expressive (conservative) extensions of Linc − , for example in the direction of FOλ ∇ [31] , or more recently, the logic LG ω [57] by Tiu and the logic G by Gacek et al. [14] .
As far as future work, we may investigate loosening the stratification condition for example in the sense of local stratification, possibly allowing to encode proofs such as type preservation in operational semantics directly in Linc − rather than with the 2-level approach [26, 32] . More general notions of stratifications are already allowed in practice, see the proof by logical relations in [15] , but not formally justified.
Another interesting problem is the connection with circular proofs, which is particularly attractive from the viewpoint of proof search, both inductively and co-inductively. This could be realized by directly proving a cut-elimination result for a logic where circular proofs, under termination and guardedness conditions completely replace (co)inductive rules. Indeed, the question whether "global" proofs are equivalent to "local" proofs [8] is still unsettled.
